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Recent theories concerning the origins of the idea of “the West” have missed 
the most important link in the story, the writings and tireless propagandizing 
efforts of Auguste Comte. It was Comte who first developed an explicit and 
elaborate idea of “the West” as a socio-political concept, basing it on a 
historical analysis of the development of the “vanguard” of humanity and 
proposing a detailed plan for the reorganisation of that portion of the world, 
before it could serve the rest of humanity to achieve the same “positive” state 
of development. Previous authors who had used “the West” did not go 
beyond employing it casually and interchangeably with “Europe.” Thus the 
modern political idea of “the West” was anything but an imperialistic project 
in its inception, despite widespread arguments in the literature that attribute 
its emergence to the needs of high imperialism. Comte’s West was meant to 






“We of the West, the advanced guard of Humanity, are citizens of no 
mean city; not lowered by narrow and local aspirations; not isolated by 
national selfishness; … We cease to be solely or primarily members of such 
or such a Western nation, England or France. We become primarily 
Western, with an immunity from all the evils which have clung around 
the exclusive prominence given to the more restricted associations; … The 
ties and obligations of the new relation exert a healthy influence on all our 
thought and action, not extinguishing, nor even lessening our love of our 
separate countries or states, but correcting its excess, and by placing it in 








1 Richard Congreve, “The West,” in Frederic Harrison, ed., International Policy: 
Essays on the Foreign Relations of England (London, 1866), 1-49, at 39-40. For 
advice, assistance or encouragement in relation to this article I thank the three 
anonymous readers and the members of the editorial board of MIH, as well as 
David Armitage, Richard Bourke, Stuart Jones, Alan Kahan, Avi Lifschitz, J.P. 
Parry, Michael Sutton, Bella Thomas and, for generously facilitating my 





I seek to show that the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857) was 
the first political thinker to elaborate an explicit and thorough socio-political 
idea of “the West” – both as a supra-national identity and as a proposed 
political entity, based on civilizational commonality and shared historical 
antecedents (an idea that is usually taken for granted as if it had always 
existed). Yet in available histories of the “idea of the West” Comte is absent. 
The attribution of such a role to Comte leads me to argue, further, that the 
modern political idea of “the West” was anything but an imperialistic project 
in its inception, despite widespread arguments in the literature that attribute 
its emergence to the needs of high imperialism. 
 Comte made a conscious decision to substitute the term “the West” 
(“l’Occident”) for “Europe” in order to avoid the confusions to which he 
thought the latter term led. Comte’s proposed entity included most of the 
peoples of Western Europe plus the peoples “descended from” them in the 
Americas and Australia-New Zealand. By proposing the new name instead of 
“Europe” he attempted to safeguard the cohesiveness of his proposed socio-
political entity for the immediate future, in the interests of the radical 
reorganisation that he was proposing. I am by no means claiming that Comte 
was the first person to use the term “the West”. The word was used from time 
to time (not least in expressions such as “in East and West” or “from East to 
West” and the like), interchangeably with “Europe.” But these casual uses 
were far from conscious definitions of a new entity or coherent political 
proposals. I will show in Section III that, although the term had been used by 
many people, especially in French, it was employed interchangeably with 
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“Europe” and the latter term always predominated in the very texts that 
sporadically featured “the West.” But “Europe” was a geographical 
expression and a system of states that included countries which Comte 
thought were not part of the “vanguard of Humanity” that he was keen to see 
reorganised. It was in order to avoid such confusions and to promote, instead, 
a distinct and precisely-defined new entity, as well as to prescribe a new 
supranational identity and allegiance for it, that Comte opted for the term 
“l’Occident.” He coined the term “Occidentalité” (Westernness) to describe the 
new identity and supranational allegiance in question.2 
Through establishing the ignored origin of the first explicit and 
elaborate modern socio-political idea of the West, this article challenges a 
currently prevalent historiographical narrative regarding not only the timing, 
but also the intentions leading to the emergence of the idea of the West. In 
what he called “A Brief Genealogy of the West” Christopher GoGwilt argued	
that	the	idea	of	the	West	emerged	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	and	that	
the	 first	 context	 in	 which	 it	 arose	 was	 “that	 of	 the	 British	 imperial	 rhetoric	
during	the	1890’s,	at	the	height	of	jingoism,	propaganda,	and	politics	of	the	‘new	
imperialism.’”3	That	 timing	 and	 association	with	 imperialism	have	been	widely	
accepted	and	reproduced	in	subsequent	scholarship,	as	will	be	seen	in	Section	II.	
And	yet,	the	first	elaborate	articulation	of	a	socio-political	concept	of	“the	West”	
emerged	 from	 the	 pen	 of	 Comte	 as	 part	 of	 a	 thorough	 reorganisation	 of	 the	
																																																								
2	Cf. the quotation by his leading British disciple in 1866 that serves as an 
epigraph to this article.	
3	Christopher GoGwilt, The Invention of the West: Joseph Conrad and the Double-
Mapping of Europe and Empire (Stanford, California, 1995), 220.	
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existing	world	order.	That	new	world	order	would,	among	other	things,	abolish	
empires	 of	 conquest	 and	 establish	 a	 “Western	 Republic”	 that	 would,	 first,	
organise	the	most	advanced	part	of	the	world	on	a	new	basis	internally.	It	would	
then	radically	alter	the	way	the	“vanguard	of	Humanity”	dealt	with	the	rest	of	the	
world.	 It	would	 offer	 to	 those	 outside	 sympathy,	 example	 and	 assistance	 on	 a	
strictly	 voluntary	 basis.	 But	 all	 forceful	 interference	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	 other	
countries	or	civilisations,	not	to	speak	of	imperial	conquests,	would	be	banished.	
And	 it	would,	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 eventually	 admit	 them	 if	 and	when	 they	were	
both	willing	and	ready	to	join	it.	I	am	therefore	arguing	that	“the	West”	as	a	self-
conscious	 and	 explicitly	 political	 proposal	 originated	 in	 a	 vociferously	 anti-








and	 rhetoric	 around	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 as	 current	 scholarship	
would	have	one	believe,	 	“the	West”	as	a	deliberate	political	project	was,	on	the	
contrary,	 fiercely	 anti-imperialist.	 That	 was	 certainly	 a	 road	 not	 taken	 in	 the	
sense	 that	here	was	a	self-assured,	conscious	and	 fully	articulated	proposal	 for	
the	 development	 of	 a	 “Western”	 identity	 and	 commonwealth,	which,	 however,	




	 Comte’s	 project	 was	 Western-Europe-centric	 and	 Latin-Europe-centric.	
This	 leads	 us	 to	 a	 further	 reminder	 of	 how	 partial	 current	 mainstream	
understandings	of	the	idea	of	“the	West”	are.	Establishing	that	the	first,	as	well	as	
the	 most	 thorough,	 modern	 articulation	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 ”the	 West”	 as	 a	 socio-
political	concept	was	that	contributed	by	Comte	and	propagated	by	his	disciples	
is	a	healthy	antidote	against	the	all-too-frequent	equation	of	“the	West”	with	the	
so-called	 “Anglosphere.”	 Comte’s	 Latin-centric	 “West,”	 explicitly	 relegating	
Britain	 and	 the	 United	 States	 to	 important	 but	 non-hegemonic	 roles,	 was	
certainly	 another	 road	 not	 taken.	 In	 all	 this,	 I	 am	 not	 proposing	 a	 “correct”	
definition	 of	 “the	West.”	We	 have	 been	 warned	 long	 ago	 not	 to	 look	 for	 such	
definitions	 of	 concepts	 with	 a	 long	 history.5	But	 I	 do	 aim	 to	 contribute	 to	 our	
understanding	of	that	history,	which,	thus	far,	has	been	surprisingly	limited.	
																																																								
4	On the staunch anti-imperialism of Comte’s British disciples see Gregory 
Claeys, Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire 1850-1920 (Cambridge, UK, 
2010), 47-123. Comte’s	global	reach	and	readership	were	enormous	for	some	
decades	after	his	death.	For	a	recent	account	see:	Mary Pickering, “Conclusion: 
The Legacy of Auguste Comte,” in Michel Bourdeau, Mary Pickering and 
Warren Schmaus, eds.,  Auguste Comte: Science, Philosophy, and Politics 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2018, forthcoming).	
5	Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. by Keith Ansell-
Pearson (Cambridge, UK, 1994), 53. 
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 In what follows, I will first (Section I) clarify the historiographical 
question I am addressing in relation to the idea of the West, including a short 
account of some of the different earlier meanings of the term. I will then 
(Section II) summarise the main arguments in existing recent literature on the 
history of the idea of the West and the periodization for the emergence of the 
modern socio-political concept of the West prevalent in that literature. I will 
proceed (Section III) to challenge the periodization proposed by recent 
scholarship and argue that the term began to be used, in French more than in 
English, in the eighteenth and increasingly in the early nineteenth century, 
but in imprecise and incoherent ways, and always interchangeably with the 
term “Europe,” until Comte decided that the confounding of the two terms 
had to stop. I then summarise (in Section IV) Comte’s complex political 
project. In Section V, I chart in some detail the gradual transition in Comte’s 
uses from “Europe” to “the West.” I also analyse the coining of the term 
“occidentalité” to describe the identity or supranational allegiance that Comte 
advocated as an alternative both to national patriotism and to a generalised 
“vague cosmopolitanism”. In order to elucidate the exact rationale for 
Comte’s substitution of “the West” for “Europe” (as well as for 
“Christendom”), I then move (Section VI) to some particularly telling 
explanations contributed by Comte’s leading disciples in Britain and France. 
Finally, I try to show in Section VII how bewildered most of Comte’s English-
speaking reviewers, translators, and even disciples or correspondents were 
when first faced with his uses of “West,” “Western,” and “Westernness” and 




I. “THE WEST”: “FROM PLATO TO NATO”? 
 
The concept of “the West” was not used by Plato, Cicero, Hobbes, Tocqueville 
and other canonized figures of what we today call the “Western” tradition. 
While “west,” pertaining to geographical location, is as old as any language, 
“the West” as a socio-political concept or as a political association based on 
cultural commonality is surprisingly modern. There were of course earlier 
uses of the word. “The West” first came to be employed as of 395 CE to 
describe the Western Roman Empire, once the Empire was divided. But the 
Western Empire soon collapsed. Later, the empire of Charlemagne was also 
known as the empire of the West.  In the eleventh century, after the Schism 
between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople, “West” came to refer to 
the Latin (Catholic) Church as opposed to the “Eastern” Greek-Orthodox 
Church. Similar uses can be found in French dictionaries on “L’Occident.” 
(The differences between the very short entry on “L’Occident” in the 
eighteenth-century Encyclopédie, written by d’Alembert, and the much longer 
entry in Larousse’s dictionary of 1866-79 are telling as to when the concept 
came to acquire its socio-political meanings). But these earlier uses, though 
they may have provided the word and useful historical antecedents for later 
adoption through elective affinities, do not amount to the same concept as 
“the West” today. According to Martin	W.	 Lewis	 and	 Kären	 E.	 Wigen, “The 
East-West division is many centuries old, and has had at least three distinct 
referents.” The first referent is said to be: “The original and persistent core of 
the West has always been Latin Christendom, derived ultimately from the 
Western Roman Empire – with (ancient) Greece included whenever the 
search for origins goes deeper.” Thus “the most significant historical divide 
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across Europe was that separating the Latin church’s Europa Occidens from the 
Orthodox lands of the Byzantine and Russian spheres.” Then they continue to 
describe the second referent: “Following the European diaspora of the 
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries…divisions within European 
Christendom began to recede in importance. In their stead, the idea of a 
supra-European West, encompassing European settler colonies across the 
Atlantic, increasingly took hold. This sense of an expanded West was greatly 
strengthened after World War II.”6 Admittedly it is a sweeping leap from the 
mediaeval division between Western-Catholic and Eastern-Orthodox 
Christians to the “expanded West … after World War II”. It may be true that 
“the idea of a supra-European West, encompassing European settler colonies 
across the Atlantic, increasingly took hold.” But when, why, how? It may look 
to us now evident that once the New World was discovered something like 
“the West” had to be invented, but did it? I wish to find out when and how 
this happened and what the alternatives were. Because, no matter how much 
sense it may make to us retrospectively, it did not occur to people in the 
newly-independent United States to talk of themselves as part of a “West” 
that included themselves and the West-Europeans, and it did not occur to 
West-Europeans to talk of themselves and their cousins in the New World as 
“the West,” until well into the nineteenth century. This article traces the 
crucial missing link between the mediaeval Catholic “Europa Occidens” and 
“the idea of a supra-European West, encompassing European settler colonies 
across the Atlantic”. To put it simply, wishing to propose a particular 





would suit his proposed new entity -- and the specific identity he wanted to 
cultivate for it -- much better than any of the available alternatives, “Europe” 
or “Christendom.” Up to – and during -- his time, when people wanted to talk 
about both sides of the Atlantic, they talked of “Christendom,” or “the 
civilized world.” And for Americans in particular “the West” meant 
something different on their shifting frontier.7 In Europe “the West” was 
available as an historical term to refer to the Western Roman Empire or later 
Charlemagne’s empire, but – casual uses here and there notwithstanding -- it 
had not been explicitly or consistently adopted to describe a clearly-defined 
socio-political entity until Comte chose to promote it. 
 Before we go into more detail on how all that changed, it should be 
noted that some of the most interesting definitions of, and debates about, “the 
West” are to be found among thinkers and writers in China, Korea, Japan, 
India, Turkey, or Russia. Germany is a particularly interesting case as 
Germans discussed “the West” more than others, but for much of their 
modern history were ambivalent about their own relation to it. Most German 
writers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the West as being 
composed of France, Britain and America, not including Germany (that was 
to change gradually but decisively after the Second World War).8 However, 
my focus here is the West’s West: when and why did thinkers and writers in 
the core of what others saw as “the West,” France, Britain and the US start 
referring to such an entity and calling it “the West”? For most of their history 
																																																								
7	See Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, The Myth of the West: America as the Last 
Empire (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1995).	
8 Riccardo Bavaj and Martina Steber, eds., Germany and ‘The West’: The History 
of a Modern Concept (Oxford, 2015). 
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the peoples now retrospectively seen as the West referred to themselves by 
other terms – most recently “Christendom,” “Europe,” or “the civilized 
nations.” And yet, it is commonplace to find self-styled histories of “the idea 
of the West” anachronistically projecting what nineteenth- or twentieth-
century thinkers and historians co-opted as their preferred collective past and 
referring to it as “the West,” no matter what the self-identifications of the 




II. A RUSSIAN IMPORT OR A SUBSTITUTE FOR “WHITENESS”? 
 
There are very few works that do not succumb to such anachronistic accounts 
and instead try to study the actual uses of the concept of the West historically. 
But these works still fail to trace the concept’s history accurately. Thus, it has 
been asserted that the first sustained elaboration in English of “the West” as a 
political-cultural entity was that found in books published by the British 
social Darwinist thinker Benjamin Kidd in 1894 and 1902. Moreover, some of 
the scholars in question attribute the emergence of the idea of the West to 
causes that may in fact have conduced to an increase in its uses but by no 
means account for its emergence, as they argue. One such claim was made, as 
already mentioned, by Christopher GoGwilt, who maintained that “[t]he idea 
of the West has a recent history, emerging around the turn of the [twentieth] 
century from the combined and related phenomena of European imperial 
expansion and the crisis of democratic politics.” In trying to explain “the shift 
from a European to a Western identity,” GoGwilt, besides attributing it to the 
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needs of imperialism, also maintained that it was the Russian debates 
between Slavophiles and Westernisers, most notably of the 1860s, that 
decisively influenced the self-descriptions of West-Europeans in the following 
decades, and led to their adoption of the term “the West” instead of 
“Europe.”9  
 Similar claims about the importation of the concept of “the West” from 
Russian debates have been made more recently by others.10 However, the very 
thinker taken in recent scholarship to have initiated the use of “the West” that 
was then to permeate the later fierce debates between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles, Chaadaev, was clearly deeply immersed in French philosophy 
and philosophy of history. In any case, moreover, the novelty of Chaadaev’s 
use of “the West” has been exaggerated. Although he did use the term in the 
“First Philosophical Letter” (written in 1829 and first published in Russia in 
1836), it was employed interchangeably with “Europe” and the terms 
“Europe” and “European” were used incomparably more times than “the 
																																																								
9 GoGwilt, The Invention of the West, 1-2, 226-7. 
10 Peggy Heller, “The Russian dawn: how Russia contributed to the emergence 
of ‘the West’ as a concept,” in Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti, eds., 
The Struggle for the West: A divided and contested legacy (London, 2010), 33-52; 
Kathleen Margaret (Peggy) Heller, “The Dawning of the West: On the Genesis 
of a Concept” (PhD thesis, Union Institute and University, Cincinnati, Ohio, 
2007); Jasper M. Trautsch, “The Invention of the ‘West’,” Bulletin of the GHI 
[German Historical Institute Washington DC], 53 (2013), 89-102. 
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West” and “Western” in that text.11 Others had done so long before him, in 
French in particular. 
 Another recent argument on the emergence of the idea of the West was 
contributed by Alastair Bonnett, who agrees with GoGwilt’s assertion that the 
first sustained elaboration in English of “the West” as a political-cultural 
entity was that found in Kidd and then attributes the emergence of the idea at 
that time to the impasses to which “narratives of racial whiteness” had fallen. 
Thus “the West, in the West, emerged in the context of the inadequacies and 
contradictions of a more racially explicit discourse” between 1890 and 1930.12 
Again, this may be an interesting contribution to explaining the 
intensification of uses, but by no means establishes the origin of the idea of 
the West in English, let alone in the West. As I will show below, sustained 
elaborations of “the West” in English had been contributed by Comte’s British 
disciples for some decades before Kidd (himself steeped in Comte13), wrote the 
works Bonnett focuses on. 
 The periodization proposed by GoGwilt and Bonnett and the claim 
that “[t]he category of ‘the West’ or ‘the Western world’…does not 
appear…before the 1890s” was also adopted recently by Jürgen Osterhammel, 
																																																								
11 Petr Iakovlevich Chaadaev, “Letters on the Philosophy of History: First 
Letter,” in Marc Raeff, ed., Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology (New 
Jersey and Sussex, 1978), 159-73. 
12  Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History 
(Basingstoke, 2004), 11, 14-39. 
13 See D.P. Crook, Benjamin Kidd: Portrait of a Social Darwinist (Cambridge, UK, 
1984), 3, 277, 283, 295, 375, 397 n84. 
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who gave a reference to Bonnett for that argument.14 The claim that “the West” 
emerged in the 1890s was also defended by the philosopher Kwame Anthony 
Appiah in his 2016 BBC Reath Lectures. Appiah maintained that “the very 
idea of the ‘West,’ to name a heritage and object of study, doesn’t really 
emerge until the 1890s, during a heated era of imperialism”.15 
 
 
III. FRENCH ORIGINS 
 
I take issue with these assertions and will show that the idea of the “West” to 
name a heritage and an object of study, as well as an elaborate and detailed 
political project, had arisen much earlier in the nineteenth century in a very 
different historical and intellectual context. There had been various earlier 
uses of the West, and I am not asserting that there was one idea of the West 
that someone fully articulated at some point. Instead, I am trying to study 
different uses of “the West.”16 There have been related myths, such as the 
tradition of translatio imperii (the notion that human beings and their 
civilization are involved in the movement of the sun from East to West), or 
																																																								
14 Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the 
Nineteenth Century, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton, NJ, 2014), 86. 
15 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Reath Lectures 2016: “Mistaken Identities: Creed, 
Country, Color, Culture”, Lecture 4: Culture; Lecture transcript 
(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/transcripts/2016_reith4_Appiah_Mista
ken_Identities_Culture.pdf -- downloaded 3 March 2017). 
16 Cf. Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas,” 
in: Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. I (Cambridge, UK, 2002), 57-89. 
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heliotropic myth.17 But “the West” as a political entity based on civilizational 
commonality is a modern idea that arose in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. I am going to show here that the first elaborate articulation of such a 
concept was contributed by Comte. 
Before the nineteenth century, when people made distinctions within 
Europe, it was a North-South division that prevailed.18 Various explanations 
have been proposed on the gradual shift, in the nineteenth century, from a 
North-South division of the mental maps of Europe and the world to the now 
more familiar East-West division.19 And there have been various versions of 
																																																								
17 See Loren Baritz, “The Idea of the West,” The American Historical Review,  66 
(1961), 618-40. 
18 Pace Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind 
of the Enlightenment (Stanford, California, 1994). See Hans Lemberg, “Zur 
Entstehung des Osteuropabegriffs im 19. Jahrhundert Vom ‘Norden’ zum 
‘Osten’ Europas,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 33 (1985), 48-91; Reto 
Speck, “The History and Politics of Civilisation: The Debate about Russia in 
French and German Historical Scholarship from Voltaire to Herder” (PhD 
thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2010); Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-
Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880) 
(Bern, 2006). 
19 Lemberg, “Zur Entstehung des Osteuropabegriffs”; Riccardo Bavaj, “‘‘The 
West’: A Conceptual Exploration,” Europäische Geschichte Online (2011); 
Bernhard Struck, “In Search of the ‘West’: The Languages of Political, Social 
and Cultural Spaces in the Sattelzeit, from about 1770 to the 1830s,” in Bavaj 
and Steber, Germany and ‘The West’, 41-54; Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, “Mental 
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the from-East-to-West tradition. The best known is the formulation by Hegel, 
who wrote that “World history travels from east to west; for Europe is the 
absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning.”20 Yet, “west” was used 
in a geographical sense here, and was somehow interchangeable with Europe 
in the very same sentence in Hegel’s formulation. Moreover, as Bonnet 
correctly remarked, “despite elaborating at length on the Oriental world, 
Hegel had little to say about the West as a unity.” It is true that “Hegel had 
scant interest in developing an explicit or overarching sense of Western 
identity.”21 What has been said of Hegel can certainly not be said of Comte. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the transitions (from Europe to West 
and from North-South to East-West distinctions) were not sudden, 
straightforward, coherent or unanimous. Ezequiel Adamovsky, who has 
traced the emergence of the concept of “Eastern Europe” in French debates 
during the nineteenth century, stresses that meanwhile references to Russia as 
part of “Northern Europe” continued to be very common well into the 1880s.22 
Similar things can be said of British thinkers. When the former Saint-Simonist 
Gustave d’Eichthal sent his friend John Stuart Mill his book Les Deux Mondes, 
the two “worlds” alluded to in the title were “l’Orient” and “l’Occident.” And 
yet, so deeply ingrained was the North-South orientation in Mill’s mind, that 
																																																																																																																																																														
Maps: Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der 
Aufklärung,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28 (2002), 493-514.	
20 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: 
Introduction: Reason in History, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. Duncan Forbes 
(Cambridge, UK, 1975), 197. 
21 Bonnett, The Idea of the West, 24. 
22 Adamovsky, Euro-Orientalism, 248-60. 
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he commented: “your views respecting the differences between the Oriental 
and the European character, seem to me perfectly just. I quite agree with you 
that an infusion of the Oriental character into that of the nations of northern 
Europe would form a combination very much better than either separately.”23 
Mill was typical. “The West” and “western” were used very rarely in English 
in the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century. One can find the 
odd reference in T.B. Macaulay using “western” interchangeably with 
“European” in juxtaposition with “the East.” For a short time Foreign 
Secretary Palmerston spoke of the treaty of alliance that he forged between 
Britain, France, Spain and Portugal in 1834 as “a quadruple alliance among 
the constitutional states of the West, which will serve as a powerful 
counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East” (or as “a formal union between 
the four constitutional states of the West to drive absolutism out of the 
[Iberian] Peninsula”).24 But then he alternated between calling the other side 
(Russia, Prussia and Austria) “the Eastern Powers” and “the three Northern 
Powers”25 – typically displaying the inchoateness of these distinctions in the 
early nineteenth century. The historian Edward Augustus Freeman used the 
term “West” sometimes, but the use was always interchangeable with 
references to “Europe,” “European,” “Europeans,” and “European 
																																																								
23 Emphasis (both times) added: Mill to d’Eichthal, March 3, 1837, in The 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. F.E.L. Priestley and John M. Robson, 33 






civilization”.26 Such uses were far from sustained or explicit advocacies of the 
adoption of a new term; nor were they definitions of a new entity in any way. 
Where it might have been expected to feature par excellence, given the 
Crusading theme of the novel, in Disraeli’s Tancred (1847), “the West” is 
absent. The terms used to denote the antithesis of the East are mainly 
“Christendom,” and “the north” and “the northern tribes.”27 
Things were different in France, where the words “l’Occident” and 
“occidental/-e” had been used much more often than the equivalent terms in 
English. France had been at the core of Charlemagne’s “Empire d’Occident” 
and thus the word was more familiar in French (the more insular English, 
whose history did not overlap with Charlemagne’s Empire, did not think in 
the same terms). Although the distinction North – South prevailed then, 
l’Occident and occidental had been sporadically employed already in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and not least by some of the 
authors who had most inspired Comte, such as Condorcet and Joseph de 
Maistre,28 and later even more by the Saint-Simonians, to some of whom 
Comte had been close in the 1820s. Henry Laurens has argued that Condorcet 
was probably the first to use the term in its modern sense at the end of the 
																																																								
26 Edward A. Freeman, Historical Essays, Third Series (New York, 1969), 214-15, 
230; Second Series, v, 176, 188, 189, 216. 
27 See J.P. Parry, “Disraeli, the east and religion: Tancred in context,” English 
Historical Review (forthcoming). 
28 Comte praised highly both Condorcet and de Maistre: System of Positive 
Policy: Or Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity (London, 
1875-1877) [hereafter: System (Engl.)], I, 589; II, 151, 369; III, 11, 527-28; IV, 2, 
262, 570-577. 
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eighteenth century. 29  (Even before Condorcet, Montesquieu had used 
“Occident,” though rarely, already in 1721. 30 ) But these uses were 
interchangeable with “l’Europe,” which appeared overwhelmingly more 
often in Condorcet’s Esquisse than “l’Occident.”31 It is also revealing to pay 
close attention to how and where “the West” was used in Condorcet’s 
Esquisse. Almost all references appear in the parts of the essay dealing with 
“the sixth epoch” and “the seventh epoch”.32 These were the parts of the book 
dealing with the fall of “the West,” the Western part of the Roman Empire, to 
the “barbarians” and then with the Crusades, and more generally the term is 
used primarily in a geographical sense to distinguish between developments 
in the two parts of Europe at particular times in the past. Meanwhile, neither 
in the Esquisse nor in any of his writings directly dealing with America and its 
influence on Europe did Condorcet (though “perhaps	the	most	brilliant	of	all	
the	 Americanists”33) refer to “the West” in any sense including Europe and 
America together.34 Similarly, in	Volume	III	of	Diderot’s	Œuvres	 (on:	Politique),	
																																																								
29 Henry Laurens, Orientales (Paris, 2007), p. 16. 
30 Montesquieu, Lettres Persanes, ed. Jacques Roger (Paris, 1992), 28, 52, 133, 
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31 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, ed. 











But there certainly occurred an intensification of uses of “l’Occident” in 
contradistinction with “l’Orient” during the early nineteenth century among 
French authors. Debates over the “Eastern question” (“la question d’Orient”), 
which accelerated after the Greek Revolution of the 1820s, made uses of 
“l’Orient” more and more frequent, and references to “l’Occident” increased 
accordingly. Lamartine provides good examples of such uses.36 But there were 
incomparably more references to “l’Europe” in the same speeches and articles 
by Lamartine, and it was “la civilisation européenne” that he proposed to 
promote in the Ottoman Orient and a new “système politique européen” that 
he wanted to see created.37 Similar things can be said of some of the Saint-
Simonians, most notably Michel Chevalier, Gustave d’Eichthal, Émile Barrault 
and Ismaÿl [Thomas] Urbain. In the early 1830s such Saint-Simonians were 
obsessing about bringing together opposites, such as matter and spirit, 
woman and man, Orient and Occident.38 
																																																								
35	Diderot,	Œuvres,	Vol.	III,	ed.	Laurent	Versini	(Paris,	1995).		
36 Alphonse de Lamartine, La Question d’Orient: Discours et articles politiques 
(1834-1861), ed. Sophie Basch and Henry Laurens (Paris, 2011), 102, 154, 157-
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37 Ibid., 102, 117, 186, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 201, 202-205, 218-220, 
229, 231, 234, 238, 240, 246-7, 250-251, 373, 378, 381. 
38 Michel Chevalier, Politique Industrielle. Système de la Méditerranée: Articles 
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One of these Saint-Simonians who used “l’Occident” extensively from 
early on had a special relationship with Comte. Gustave d’Eichthal had been 
Comte’s first disciple. He later emancipated himself and joined the Saint-
Simonian “sect.”39 Despite their estrangement after that, d’Eichthal sent Les 
Deux Mondes to Comte, who replied that he was keen to read it.40 D’Eichthal 
drew an extensive list of differences between “l’Orient” and “l’Occident.”41 He 
also offered his readers a map where he drew clear lines of demarcation. His 
median line dividing West and East almost coincided with the lines drawn by 
major rivers and separated “la race allemande” from the “races slave et 
hongroise”. It then left Europe, traversing Malta and going trough Africa 
from the Cape of Tunis to the Cape of Good Hope. The details show that he 
																																																																																																																																																														
et la Méditerranée (Houilles, France, 2008); Michael Drolet, “A nineteenth-
century Mediterranean union: Michel Chevalier’s Système de la Méditerranée,” 
Mediterranean Historical Review, 30, (2015), 147-68; Jean-François Figeac, “La 
géopolitique orientale des saint-simoniens,” Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 85 
(2012), 251-68; Philippe Régnier, “Le mythe oriental des Saint-Simoniens,” in 
Magali Morsy, ed., Les Saint-Simoniens et l’Orient: Vers la modernité (Aix-en-
Provence, 1989), 29-49; Michel Levallois and Sarga Moussa, eds.,  
L’Orientalisme des saint-simoniens (Paris, 2006). 
39 Correspondance Générale et Confessions (8 vols, Paris/La Haye, 1973-1990) 
[hereafter: Correspondance], I, 78-85, 104-110, 133-38, 140-146, 160-161; Hervé 
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40 Comte to d’Eichthal, October 23, 1836, Correspondance, I, 275. 
41	Gustave	d’Eichthal,	Les Deux Mondes (Paris, 1836), 23-31.	
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took the distinction too literally in geographical terms in a way Comte would 
never do. 
The authors, however, who used “l’Occident” in the first decades of 
the nineteenth century by no means meant all the same thing by the term. 
That is not unrelated to the fact that “l’Orient” did not have a clear meaning. 
The prominence of the Eastern Question meant that the Ottoman lands were 
quite commonly called “l’Orient.” But then there was a deeper “Orient” 
stretching to India, China, Japan etc. Chevalier alluded to the confusion when 
he wrote, in 1836: “Les peuples que nous avons l’habitude d’appeler 
Orientaux, mais qui ne sont que du Petit Orient, ont cessé d’être pour 
l’Europe des adversaires redoutables. Ils lui ont rendu leurs épées sans retour 
à Héliopolis, à Navarin, à Adrinople.” He distinguished that “Petit Orient” 
from “le Grand Orient” that was further east.42 But things were even more 
complicated by the fact that more and more people in the nineteenth century 
began to draw a vague distinction within Europe between East and West. This 
means that, as the opposite of “l’Orient,” “l’Occident” could mean a number 
of things, from Western Europe as opposed to Eastern Europe, to Europe as a 
whole as opposed to “the East” or to the rest of the world. And then, an 
additional complication was beginning to be contributed by America. We can 
discern the inconsistency in the use of the terms even in the writings, within 
the same year, of authors related to each other and cross-referencing each 
other. In Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord Chevalier refers approvingly to the 
first edition of d’Eichthal’s Les Deux Mondes. Chevalier speaks of the two 
“hémisphères” meaning what we would understand today, with America 
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being on a different hemisphere from Europe.43 But when d’Eichthal talked 
repeatedly of the two “hemispheres,” he was using “hémisphères” to 
distinguish between Western and Eastern Europe, and included his map with 
detailed delimitations. And when d’Eichthal was criticized by one of his 
German relatives that Les Deux Mondes was typically French in that it was 
“looking too much towards the South,” he replied that others had to write on 
other parts, conceding that an appreciation of Germany was entirely missing 
from his book, as was an appreciation of England, America, Spain etc. After 
which he added: “Vous connaissez peut-être l’ouvrage de mon ami Michel 
Chevalier sur l’Amérique, qu’il aurait mieux pu intituler Sur l’Occident.”44 
Why would d’Eichthal think that Chevalier’s book ought to have been 
entitled Sur l’Occident? Presumably America was now “l’Occident,” or at least 
a major part of it. But he said nothing of the kind when talking of “l’Occident” 
in Les Deux Mondes a few months earlier. 
That is one of the reasons why Comte was original and important to 
this story, because he made a conscious decision to abandon “Europe” and 
substitute “the West” to designate an entity that he described in meticulous 
detail. Others who employed the term before him or contemporaneously with 
him were neither precise nor consistent in their use. D’Eichthal is typical of 
the inconsistencies. Few people had used “l’Occident” as much and as early 
as he did. However, he went on in later years promoting “l’unité européenne” 
and a “confédération européenne” explicitly based on the kind of pan-
Christian unity promoted by the Holy Alliance, on Russia’s initiative and of 
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course including Orthodox Russia.45 That membership list was anathema to 
Comte, who strongly preferred the more restricted membership, based 
around Charlemagne’s Europe, or pre-Reformation Catholic Europe, the 
Europe envisaged by Maistre, Bonald, and Saint-Simon, plus the extra-
European colonial offshoots of the peoples in question. In order to avoid the 
contradictions and confusions arising from the use of that much more vague 
term, “Europe,” Comte decided to name his supranational entity “the West.” 
 
 
IV. COMTE’S POLITICAL PROJECT: THE “REPUBLIC OF THE WEST” 
 
Comte is mainly seen as a philosopher who made important contributions to 
the history and philosophy of science and as the founder of Sociology. Yet 
Comte himself saw his life’s work as primarily political and as a project for 
social and political reorganisation after the cataclysm of the French 
Revolution. He regarded his scientific and epistemological work as a 
parenthesis (admittedly longer than planned) that would corroborate his 
political project.46 Many commentators have interpreted his work as divided 






46 Pierre Laffitte, “Conversations avec A. Comte: Notes manuscrites de P. 
Laffitte sur des conversations entre 1845 et 1850,” p. 12 bis., Maison Auguste 
Comte manuscripts.  
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Cours de Philosophie Positive (1830-1842). 47  The second “phase” was 
preoccupied by the development of his political project accompanied by his 
elaboration of the “Religion of Humanity.” The major work of that period was 
the Système de Politique Positive, published in four volumes between 1851 and 
1854.48  Today most Comte scholars reject the thesis that his career went 
through an overwhelming change in his last decade or so.49 Be that as it may, 
around the middle of the 1840s Comte’s mind took a religious turn and the 
“Religion of Humanity” was born. He attributed his religious turn to his 
meeting (in late 1844) with the much younger Clotilde de Vaux, and her 
untimely death in 1846. In any case his religious focus had started by 1845.50 
 According to the founder of Positivism, “the fundamental problem” of 
the politics of advanced societies was that “of reconciling Order and 
Progress.” Comte had a radical solution. He advocated the introduction of a 
new “spiritual power” that would oversee “the spiritual reorganization of 
society” and the corresponding separation between the spiritual and the 
temporal powers. He was inspired by his understanding of the role of the 
separation of spiritual from temporal power in Western Europe’s Middle 
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Ages and influenced by Maistre’s Du Pape (1819) in that respect. The Catholic 
Church and its Pontiff had played a beneficial role during the Middle Ages by 
exercising a spiritual power that both curbed the excesses of the secular rulers 
and kept the peoples of Western Europe together in a spiritual unity despite 
their fragmentation into separate political jurisdictions. During the Middle 
Ages the human mind was not ready for anything better than the dominance 
of the spiritual domain by the Catholic clergy. But in Comte’s own time, 
things were different, and the “positive” age ought to lead to a different 
political arrangement. 
This brings us to one of Comte’s most cherished ideas, his “law of the 
three states.”51 Comte was proud of what he saw as the originality of his “law” 
and often insisted that he had “discovered” it as early as 1822.52 He argued 
that humankind had gone through three stages of evolution, depending on 
the development of the human mind in particular. The first stage he called 
“theological,” when people attributed everything that happened in the 
natural world to direct divine intervention. Then came the “metaphysical” 
state, when gods were replaced by abstract entities and substances as 
explanations for phenomena. The final state of the human mind was the 
“positive” state, which was characterised by scientific explanations and by a 
quest for relative knowledge and laws of explanation (as opposed to the quest 
for absolutes and for ultimate causes that had characterised the previous states). 
The first stage was one of offensive war or conquest; the second, transitional, 
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stage was one of defensive war; the third, positive, stage was industrial and 
peaceful.53 Thus, in the positive state, war and conquest would be seriously 
anachronistic.  
 The positive state would be the final and permanent state of the human 
mind and human society. Comte thought that what he saw as the most 
advanced part of the world, “the élite of humanity,” ought to be organised in 
a particular way that would overcome the anarchy that had resulted from the 
“metaphysical” politics of the previous centuries of critical upheaval. This 
much-needed reorganization was possible in his time, thanks to his 
systematisation of Positivism and elaboration of Sociology. He argued that 
the most advanced part of the world was ready for that new dispensation, 
that would recreate the salutary separation of spiritual from temporal power, 
but, crucially, without any need to believe in the existence of a supernatural 
God. He envisaged for the theoretical class (“les savants”), the scientists-
thinkers-philosophers, to form themselves into an organized body and 
constitute “the Spiritual Power” for the whole of the advanced world (as of 
1848 Comte decided to stop calling the power in question “spiritual” and to 
substitute instead “moderating power”54). Meanwhile, temporal power would 
be in the hands of members of the capitalist class in each distinct temporal 
republic (headed by bankers). 
Comte also introduced another very significant stipulation: The 
temporal states in question had to be small in size for them to be well 
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governed and for the spontaneous and “organic” feelings of patriotism to 
arise (given his firm belief that “what sociability gains in breadth, it loses in 
energy.”55). For example, France would have to be decomposed into seventeen 
smaller republics;56 Ireland, Scotland, England, Wales would be separated, and 
“England” would have to relinquish all its transmarine dependencies, France 
would relinquish Algeria, and so on. Each state would have to be roughly of 
the size of Belgium, Corsica or Tuscany. Comte went to great lengths to offer 
exact details on the size and population of each of the states, as well as on the 
ideal social and occupational composition of each of the populations. Given 
the small size of the proposed temporal states, and the restriction of their 
powers to the “temporal” functions that Comte had reserved for them, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that he was proposing “the withering away of the 
state.”57 
 The most crucial part in Comte’s political scheme was that the scale 
over which the temporal power and the spiritual (or moderating) power 
would operate would not be identical.58 The temporal governments would 
rule over the industrial organization of each of the small states of the size of 
Tuscany or Belgium. The spiritual power, however, would be one for the 
whole of the Western Republic (République occidentale), which would include 
the five great “national” – or, more accurately, linguistic/cultural -- 
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groupings of Western Europe (French, Italian, Iberian, British, German) as 
well as their colonial transplantations in the Americas, Australia etc. Whereas 
the temporal power would look after solidarity among the members of each 
limited state, the spiritual power would ensure continuity between the dead, 
future generations, and those living in the present throughout the West.59 The 
Spiritual Power would be charged with the education of the youth, but also 
with the continual education and moral guidance of people throughout life as 
well as keeping the temporal power in check. The capital of the new 
supranational entity united by the spiritual power, “the West,” was to be, 
“naturellement,” Paris.  Comte went to meticulous (as well as ridiculous) 
lengths of detail to describe the composition of the “Western Republic,” the 
reasons for inclusion or exclusion, the primacy of France within it, and then 
the hierarchical precedence he accorded to the other two Southern, Catholic 
and Latin, nations (“Italy” and ‘Spain”) over the Northern and Protestant 
nations (“England” and “Germany”) and much else. Here is how he 
delineated what he meant by “the West” in the 1848 Discours: “Since the fall 
of the Roman empire, and more especially from the time of Charlemagne, 
France has always been the centre, socially as well as geographically, of this 
Western region which may be called the nucleus of Humanity.” Now, north 
and south of this “natural centre”, there were “two pairs of nations, between 
which France will always form an intermediate link, partly from her 
geographical position, and also from her language and manners.” The one 
pair was for the most part Protestant. It comprised, first, “the great Germanic 
body, with the numerous nations that may be regarded as its offshoots; 




the United States, notwithstanding their present attitude of rivalry.” The 
other pair was “exclusively Catholic”: “It consists of the great Italian 
nationality...; and of the population of the Spanish Peninsula (for Portugal, 
sociologically considered, is not to be separated from Spain), which has so 
largely increased the Western family by its colonies.” Finally: “To complete 
the conception of this group of advanced nations, we must add two accessory 
members, Greece and Poland, countries which, though situated in Eastern 
Europe, are connected with the West, the one by ancient history, the other by 
modern.”60 
 Comte was to elaborate much more on the details of the membership 
of the Western Republic and, even more, on how exactly it was to be 
governed during the following few centuries of “transition” to the “normal” 
state of Humanity. For the Western Republic was not to be the final stage of 
his plan. It was just necessary in order to prepare and lead the transition of 
the whole of Humanity to the future that Comte thought the scientific laws of 
his Sociology had prescribed for it, the “positive” and permanent state. The 
West would then eventually disappear and be merged into the greater 
republic that would include the whole of Humanity. When that transition was 
completed (it would take around seven centuries, Comte calculated), the 
capital would move from Paris to Constantinople, which would become the 
permanent seat of the spiritual power and the centre of Humanity. Comte 
again developed in great detail the plans for the transition, including which 
groups could be admitted first and which later -- depending on their 
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civilization, religion and consequent degree of susceptibility to the “positive” 
message. He was keen to point to shortcuts that would spare major parts of 
humanity the need to go through the turbulent evolution that the West had 
gone through and instead would allow them to pass straight from the state 
they found themselves in to the positive state. 
 Thus, Comte’s “West” was a complex “sociological” notion, and 
certainly not primarily a geographic entity. He set out to study the historical 
development of the part of humanity that was most advanced, the “avant-
garde of Humanity”. Through that history he reached his “scientific” 
interpretation of the past and future of humanity – which he elaborated 
through his new science of “Sociology.” That avant-garde of Humanity was 
ready to receive Comte’s proposed “positive” reorganisation. However, for 
that reorganisation to succeed, the cohesion of the most advanced part of 
humanity had to be safeguarded. Because only that part of the world was 
ready, in his time, for the new, “positive,” dispensation. Hence Comte’s 
concern to exclude for the time being more backward parts of humanity from 
the proposed unit that had to be re-organized. Those “backward” parts 
included Russia and most of Eastern Europe. The use of the name “Europe” 
in reference to the countries that he included in the vanguard of humanity (by 
more or less everyone else until -- and during -- his time) led to inevitable 
confusion and indeed contradiction, Comte decided. “Europe” was seen -- at 
least since the time of Peter the Great – as including Russia, and consequently 
also the lands in-between Russia and Western Europe. Meanwhile, “Europe” 
did not include populations that Comte thought belonged to the vanguard of 
humanity, peoples descended mainly from the “five great nations” but living 
outside geographical Europe, in the Americas, Australia or New Zealand. 
	 32	
Now, these latter populations were often included (along with 
Europeans) in his time under the name “Christendom.” But Christendom 
would not do either. First, it was still confusingly over-inclusive, as the 
populations of most of Eastern Europe and Russia were also Christian. And 
second, Christianity (and – crucially -- more precisely, Catholic Christianity 
with its spiritual unity under one Pope and one sacerdotal organization) had 
been only one of the elements or phases that had shaped the vanguard of 
humanity. The other formative influences had been the incorporation of the 
populations in question under the Roman Empire, mediaeval feudalism, the 
unity of – most of – those populations under Charlemagne, and the 
revolutionary “metaphysical” upheavals of the previous five centuries 
culminating in the French Revolution. It was the populations that had shared 
in -- at least most of -- those successive experiences that had become the 
vanguard of humanity according to Comte, and it was through an analysis of 
their history that he formed his “scientific” laws of Sociology.  
The overall project of the political and social reorganisation of the 
vanguard of humanity was already conceived by Comte by the mid-1820s, 
and had been explained in his several youthful works, the opuscules de 
jeunesse. Though he was to add immense amounts of detailed stipulations in 
his later works (particularly in the Système de Politique Positive), the major 
building blocks and proposals were already there in the 1820s. What did 
change between the opuscules of the 1820s and the Discours of 1848 was the 
name of the entity in question. From “Europe” in the 1820s it was renamed 




V. FROM “L’EUROPE” TO “L’OCCIDENT” 
 
As early as 1816 Comte had displayed a sense of the unity of the five 
“nations” he was later to include in the West. “J’aimerais mieux vivre 
médiocrement en Amérique que de nager dans l’opulence dans l’Anglo-
Germano-Latino-Hispano-Gaule,” wrote the eighteen-year old Comte on 29 
October 1816.61 This was written before Comte met Henri de Saint-Simon and 
became his secretary in 1817. The lumping together of the nations in question 
was shared by Comte’s new master. Saint-Simon also referred to “Europe” or 
“Western Europe” as being composed of the peoples he often addressed as 
follows: “Français, Anglais, Belges, Hollandais, Danois, Suédois, Allemands, 
Italiens, Espagnols et Portugais … c’est à vous collectivement que cet écrit 
s’adresse.”62 He referred to these same peoples collectively as “l’Occident de 
l’Europe,” “l’Europe occidentale,” or “la grande nation des Européens 
occidentaux.”63 On one occasion in 1822 (at the time when Comte was still his 
secretary) Saint-Simon used both terms, addressing the peoples he had 
enumerated earlier as “Européens, Occidentaux, …”64 The comma makes a 
difference from his usual references to “les Européens occidentaux” and turns 
“Occidentaux” into a noun in this case, and thus into an alternative apellation 
																																																								
61 Correspondance, I, 17. At that time Comte was seriously contemplating to 
move to the United States. See René Rémond, Les États Unis devant l’Opinion 
Française 1815-1852, 2 vols (Paris, 1962), II, 495. 
62 Henri Saint-Simon, Œuvres complètes, ed. Juliette Grange, Pierre Musso, 
Philippe Régnier and Frank Yonnet, 4 vols (Paris, 2012), IV, 2764, 2767. 
63 Ibid., IV, 2764, 2767, 2762, 2763, 2768. 
64 Ibid., IV, 2764, 2767, 2764. 
	 34	
of the nations he referred to. But the rest of the time he went on talking of 
“l’Europe” and “les européens.”65 Saint-Simon’s “Europe” was quite close to 
the entity that Comte was later to start calling “l’Occident,” and Saint-Simon 
displayed the same kind of indecisiveness about whether to call it “l’Europe,” 
“l’Occident,” or “l’Europe occidentale.” But the first and the last of these 
alternatives prevailed by far in Saint-Simon’s writings. His Europe was based 
mainly on Charlemagne’s former empire, plus “England”.66 
 Comte had displayed a similar indecisiveness and indeed explicit 
uneasiness at least once with the use of the term “Europe” to describe the 
supranational unit that he was talking about quite early on. In the 1826 
“Considerations on the Spiritual Power,” while describing the supra-national 
authority of the “spiritual power,” to which he was allocating an overarching 
role transcending state jurisdictions, he wrote in a footnote:  
Obliged to employ one or other of two expressions, European or 
universal, in order to designate that part of the functions of the spiritual 
power which is exerted over international relations [sur les relations de 
peuple à peuple], I prefer  the former as being the most accurate and 
consecrated by past usage, although probably it is at once too large and too 
narrow.67 But I employ it without prejudice to the territorial extension 
which the spiritual power shall some time or other attain.68 
That uneasiness seems to have come to a head by early 1842. Already in the 
last volume of the Cours Comte began to display indecision regarding how to 
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call the historic entity composed of the “five great nations.” Most of the time 
he used “Europe,” but “Western Europe” (“l’occident européen”) became 
more and more frequently used by the end. 
 There are some sophisticated analyses related to Comte’s ideas on the 
West or on Europe contributed by Comte scholars in French in the last two 
decades or so.69 Tonatiuh Useche Sandoval has produced an excellent analysis 
of the meaning and role of “l’Occident” in Comte’s overall system. He notes 
that in the last lessons of the Cours Comte began treating Europe as a 
“republic” and that he hesitated between the adjectives “européen” and 
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“occidental,” but that the former predominated by far. Then he remarks that 
we have to wait till the publication of the Système (1851-1854) for “européen” 
to give way to “occidental.”70 And this is roughly true as far as published 
works are concerned.71  But we can trace the victory of “l’Occident” and 
“occidental” more closely by following Comte’s correspondence (which 
Useche Sandoval does not use in this context with one exception of a 
relatively later letter of 1846). In his first letter to J.S. Mill, in 1841, Comte 
wrote that he was just then finishing, in his latest volume of the Cours, the 
elaboration of the proposal for the spontaneous institution of a “European 
committee” (“d’un comité européen”) aiming to coordinate the common 
movement of philosophical regeneration, once positivism would have planted 
its flag thanks to the publication of his work. That permanent committee, 
composed of thirty members, would represent the populations of Western 
Europe (“de l’Occident européen”), which, since Charlemagne, “have always 
advanced more or less in synergy”. All the rest of Europe and the rest of the 
world would have to remain for a long time “outside this association, which 
makes up the elements of the great European republic [la grande république 
européenne] of which we are both fellow-citizens.” 72  Thus “European” 
prevailed in November 1841, though “Western Europe” was mentioned as 
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well. In the next letter, on January 17, 1842, ambivalence is obvious, with both 
“la grande république européenne” and “toute la communauté occidentale” 
coinciding in the same page. Similar ambivalence occurs within the same 
sentence on March 4, 1842 when Comte talks of “la nouvelle synergie 
européenne des cinq grandes populations occidentales.”73 In May 1842 Comte 
wrote to Mill that “Plus notre siècle avance, plus on y doit sentir que tous les 
Européens occidentaux sont, au font, concitoyens”.74 Comte’s see-saw between 
“Europe” and “Western Europe” continued for some months.75 But he seems 
to have made up his mind by the end of 1842, when he wrote of the “phase 
actuellement atteinte par l’ensemble de la révolution européenne ou plutôt 
occidentale.”76 In the remainder of his letters to Mill, from 1843 to 1846, it was 
“l’Occident,” “en Occident,” “dans l’ensemble de notre Occident,” 
“Occidentales,” “concert occidental,” “les mœurs occidentales” that would 
clearly prevail. 77  Similarly, it was “la grande famille occidentale” and 
“l’ensemble de l’Occident” that Comte was to write of to other British 
correspondents as well in the same years.78  
Comte had also begun using in the correspondence a term pointing 
towards his coinage of the noun “occidentalité” by 1848. At some point Mill 
took issue with Comte’s insistence that the English were the most prone to 
nationalistic prejudices among the five “advanced” populations and retorted 
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that the knowledgeable portion of the English were cosmopolitans 
(“cosmopolites”) beyond what Comte could imagine.79 The Frenchman replied 
that such “vague” cosmopolitanism that led people (such as the English 
cosmopolitans) to place on the same level the French or the Germans, on the 
one hand, and the Turks or the Chinese, on the other, was not conducive to 
real political cooperation, which required habitual sentiments of more 
complete sympathy. He explained: “La situation fondamentale de l’élite de 
l’humanité réclame partout l’urgente prépondérance, non d’un insuffisant 
cosmopolitisme, mais d’un actif européanisme, ou plutôt d’un profond 
occidentalisme, relatif à la solidarité nécessaire des divers éléments de la 
grande république moderne” -- after which he repeated the historical 
antecedents that he regarded as binding together the five “elite” populations.80 
Comte explicitly considered and then abandoned “européanisme,” opting 
instead for “occidentalisme.” (In that he departed from his former master, 
who had used “européanisme,” more or less equating it with cosmopolitan 
Christian morality or philanthropy -- thus Saint-Simon was conflating and 
merging “European” and “universal,” between which Comte was clear that 
he had to choose in 1826).81 Comte insisted that an intermediate level of 
allegiance to the Western family of nations, the “Western Republic” would be 
necessary in order for the urgently needed social and political reorganisation 
of the vanguard of humanity to take place, before it could help others and 
gradually accept them one by one (eventually merging into “Humanity”). He 
named that allegiance “occidentalisme” and then “occidentalité”. 
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 The latter concept is explained further in the Discours of 1848 (and then 
in the Système) in a passage that makes clear both the mediaeval inspiration of 
the notion and the completely new character that it needed to assume in the 
“positive” era: “Entre la simple nationalité, que le génie social de l’antiquité 
ne dépassa jamais, et l’Humanité définitive, le moyen âge a institué un 
intermédiaire trop méconnu aujourd’hui, en fondant une libre occidentalité. Notre 
premier devoir politique consiste maintenant à la reconstruire sur des bases 
inébranlables, en réparant l’anarchie suscitée par l’extinction du régime 
catholique et féodal.”82 But it should be stressed that Comte did not insist on 
the need to cultivate “Westernness” by any desire for permanent exclusions. 
To the extent that the systematisation and reorganisation that he was 
proposing would be accomplished, Comte continued, it would show that 
“Westernness” (l’occidentalité) constituted just a last preparation to the real 
“Humanity” (Humanité). He added that the fundamental laws of human 
evolution, that were the philosophical basis of the final regime, “applied 
necessarily to all climates and to all races, except for simple inequalities of 
speed.”83 
In other words, the “Westernness” that had emerged in the Middle 
Ages needed to be reconstructed on new “positive” bases and until that 
reconstruction was complete it would be necessary for the West not to be 
adulterated by the inclusion of peoples that did not share the same degree of 
advancement and cohesion as the five “advanced” or “elite” populations. But 
once the reconstruction of the vanguard of Humanity, the West, would be 
complete, the positive laws established scientifically would be able to be 
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applied to the rest of Humanity to bring the more backward populations into 
the fold, at their own pace and on their own initiative. That process once 
achieved, Humanity would be complete in its “normal” and “permanent” 
state. 
 Once Comte adopted the term “l’Occident” to describe the entity he 
was envisaging he did make the most of it. From July 1848 that he published 
the Discours sur l’Ensemble du Positivisme, all books and circulars published by 
the rue Monsieur-le-Prince publishing industry were headed “RÉPUBLIQUE 
OCCIDENTALE.” The common Navy that would replace standing armies 
would be called “Western Navy.” Comte was very alert to the importance of 
symbols.84 He therefore designed a common Western currency, a Western flag, 
and much more. On all these he went to astonishing degrees of detail, for, as 
Mill observed, “[h]e cannot bear that anything should be left unregulated”.85 
 
 
VI. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE EPIGONES: DEFINITIONS OF “THE 
WEST” BY SOME OF COMTE’S DISCIPLES 
 
In 1866 a group of British Comtists published International Policy: Essays on the 
Foreign Relations of England. The first essay, signed by the leader of the British 
Comtists at the time, was entitled “The West.”86 According to Congreve, the 
decline of the power of Catholicism, and the consequent disunion of 
mediaeval Europe, were “first evidenced by disorder in the international 
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relations of its constituent states.” By the same token, it was “in the same 
international relations that the restoration of order must begin”. Congreve 
argued that ever-increasing contact among peoples had led to a growing 
sense of mutual interdependence. The latter led to the conception of a 
common interest, until all this begot the conception of the unity of the human 
race. Humanity had to be united, but on two conditions: first, that the power 
which attempted its unification should be duly subordinated to the whole 
(Humanity) on whose behalf it did it; and second, that the agent must be 
complex, like the larger body on which it was to act -- constituted by several 
nations differing from one another. Thus no mere national interest could get 
ascendancy and there would be ample provision for a larger range of 
sympathies with those outside, and a just mutual control with reference to 
those within. The familiar units of social organisation were  
• the family 
• the country 
• Humanity  
For the new dispensation that the Comtists envisaged, one more unit was 
necessary between the country and Humanity: this unit would be, on the 
one hand, wider than the country/state, and thus not as isolated or selfish 
as the state; while, on the other hand, it would be less extensive than 
Humanity, and thus not as powerless for action and practical purposes as 
Humanity at large. The intermediate unit needed was “the West.” Thus, 
social existence would be organized along the lines: 
• the family 
• the country 
	 42	
• the West 
• Humanity 
According to Congreve, “the leadership of the human race is invested in the 
West”. But here we come to the crucial issue of the name of the unit in 
question: “The actual consciousness of the world accepts this term Europe as 
a whole.” However, “Europe” would not do and he would attempt “to get a 
clear conception of what the term the West means, how far it is synonymous 
with, how far different from, Europe.” In other words, Congreve continued, 
“let us seek an adequate answer to the question – What constitutes the 
West?”87 The first step needed was one of exclusion: “The elimination of 
Russia from the system is the first great rectification. She is an Eastern, not a 
Western power, or more Eastern than Western.” The criterion for membership 
was “the participation directly or indirectly, completely or incompletely, in 
the progressive civilisation which, since the repulse of the theocracy of 
Western Asia by Greece, has characterized Europe” (including the intellectual 
cultivation of Greece; the social incorporation of Western Europe by Rome; 
the Catholic-Feudal organisation of mediaeval Europe; and the revolutionary 
upheavals of the previous five centuries).88 
Another interesting testing ground was Ottoman Turkey, which 
according to Congreve was “more Western than Russia.” It was “far more 
intimately bound up with the history of Europe than is Russia, whose 
admission to that history is barely a century old.” Besides this historical 
argument, there was also a far from unimportant political argument: “It is her 
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religion which would make me wish for her admission, were it legitimate on 
other grounds.” Every recognition of Turkey, down to the latest at the time of 
the Crimean War, had been “valuable as a protest against the spirit of 
religious exclusiveness,” and “distinctly set aside the claim of Christian 
nations, as such, to domineer over others in the name of an inherent 
superiority conferred on them by their religion.” It would be ideal in this 
respect to have Turkey included simultaneously as Russia would be 
excluded. However, this could not be: “Whatever the advantages of such a 
view, they must be foregone rather than weaken by any immature concession 
the cohesion of the Western body, already far too weak.”89 
Congreve stressed that for the Positivists, followers of Comte’s precept 
of “altruism” and “living for others,” the way forward was “sympathy”. 
Thus, he defined as the “aim” of the West “the peaceful action on the rest of 
the [human] race, with the purpose of raising, or enabling its various 
constituents to rise, in due order to the level it has itself attained.” Such a 
body would “stand forth as the model at once and director of the rest. Duly 
organised within, conscious of its functions and obligations, it would 
appreciate the wants and situation of those without it; and, without any 
pressure or unwarranted interference with their legitimate independence of 
action, it would be ready to help them in their onward course.”90 
The article concluded with a six-page “Note on the United States of 
America.” The whole tone shows a growing unease (obvious in British 
thought more generally by the 1860s) about the rise of the US and its 
increasing assertiveness following the Civil War. For, although the US 
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deserved much more attention as part of the West than it had so far received, 
Congreve was adamant that one should not meanwhile admit “her claim to 
be the latest outcome of the mature political wisdom of the race, the type to 
which all others must eventually conform.” The problem was that “America 
claims no less, it would seem” he added. “America must weigh heavily in the 
scales of international policy; but she weighs by her mass, not by her ideas”.91 
American reviewers – even if otherwise positive overall -- were not amused 
by the part that concerned themselves.92  
Similarly, Comte’s appointed successor in France, Pierre Laffitte, 
explained in 1881: “With the spread of Positivism, the use, as a political 
expression, of the purely geographical term ‘European’ must be dropped: for 
it was applied in an utterly irrational way to an assemblage of very distinct 
and dissimilar peoples.” As used, “the apellation errs at once by excess and 
by defect.” As he explained, “Democratic hallucinations notwithstanding, 
there is no United States of Europe; for this portion of the world comprises 
Oriental populations, such as Turkey and Russia, while it does not include the 
various colonial extensions of the West, especially the Americans, who 
manifestly form part of it.”93 
And “Europe” was not the only term that had to be superseded and 
replaced by “the West”. In 1861 Laffitte had stressed that “before the group 
formed by the advanced populations can adopt a proper policy towards the 
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rest of the world, a change must be brought about in its way of looking at itself.”94 
That change consisted “in dropping the notion of Christendom, and adopting 
in place of it, the notion of Westerndom95  or The West.” “The West” was 
preferable because it was more precise for the reason explained already 
(exclusion of Eastern Christians), as well as because it represented fully “the 
whole set of antecedents that have helped to mould this memorable group.” 
But the substitution of Westerndom for Christendom would also have a salutary 
influence on its external policy: For the Christian point of view, “which so 
profoundly vitiates our appreciation of the other peoples of the world,” 
would, if “Westerndom” were adopted in its stead, stop being a barrier to 
Westerners’ capacity to understand other peoples accurately.96 
 
 
VII. THE NOVELTY OF “THE WEST” IN ENGLISH 
 
Initially even some of Comte’s disciples or translators were not sure how to 
handle the conceptual innovation that he had introduced. The novelty of the 
term in English is obvious both from the way Congreve introduced his 
definition in 1866 and from the way reviewers commented on it. “What is 
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noted an American reviewer. 97  And British reviewers found Congreve’s 
definition and membership list of “the West” idiosyncratic and some 
protested against his (and Comte’s) exclusion of some Christian nations from 
membership of “the West.” 98  Reviewers explicitly took exception to the 
replacement of “what once was Christianity till essayists found out a better 
name for it.”99 Others commented on “what he calls the West” referring to 
Congreve as “paradoxical”.100 A Westminster Review author referred to “’the 
West,’ as Comtists affectedly choose to call Europe at large,” and went on to 
observe that “[t]he West being a new general term, admits of a fresh 
definition better than could be easily supplied of that for which it stands”, 
and then hastened to complain against “the arbitrary manner in which every 
European influence is discarded from the definition of ‘the West’ that cannot 
be traced back to the times of Imperial Rome”.101  
Earlier, Harriet Martineau, in her free translation of the Cours, was 
unable to follow Comte in his linguistic innovations, which, as we have seen, 
																																																								






1866),	484-5.	Meanwhile,	a	sympathetic reviewer explained that “The idea of 
Humanity, which has become too familiar to need any exposition here, has 
given birth to an offshoot which may be called ‘the West,’ or ‘Occidentality.’”	
“International	Policy,”	The	Reader	(21	July	1866),	661.	
	 47	
were already incipient in the last lessons of the Cours (written in the end of 
1841 and in early 1842). She translated “qu’aucune autre branche de la grande 
famille occidentale”102 as “than any other branch of the great family,”103 thus 
avoiding to translate or acknowledge “occidentale.” And where Comte had 
written “tendant à isoler profondément le peuple anglais de toute le reste de 
la famille occidentale”104 Martineau translated “which tend to separate the 
English people from the rest of the European family.”105 Martineau again did 
not translate “dans le reste de notre Occident” at all.106 Further on, where 
Comte had written “la république occidentale” Martineau translated “the great 
European commonwealth”.107 The omission of the “Western” dimension becomes 
even more striking near the end of Lesson 57, where Comte had written on 
his projected Comité positif occidental. 108  Martineau completely ignored the 
emphasis on the supra-national, “occidental” character of the proposal 
outlined in the original text.109 
 No less interestingly, throughout the correspondence that I discussed 
in Section V between Comte and Mill, the Englishman remained remarkably 
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unconverted to Comte’s new lexical preferences and kept replying by using 
“Europe” or “European” each time Comte had used “West” or “Western”.110 
 The reluctance became bewilderment when it came to translating 
Comte’s new coinage, “Occidentalité.” J.A. Bridges clearly hesitated in his 
first translations of the Discours of 1848. For example, in a text already quoted, 
Comte’s original read “le moyen âge a institué un intermédiaire trop 
méconnu aujourd’hui, en fondant une libre occidentalité.”111 In his translation 
in 1865 Bridges rendered the text: “the Middle Ages introduced the 
intermediate conception of Christendom, or Occidentality.”112 That translation 
was inconsistent with Comte’s intention, which was to reject “Christendom” 
as a collective description and stress the “Occidentality” developed only 
among Catholic Western Christians. But the neologism seems to have been 
too much for Bridges, so he added “Christendom” which was at least more 
familiar. A later translator of texts by Laffitte preferred “Westerndom”.113 
Clearly, “the West” needed some getting used to. But the term did gradually 
become more and more employed in English in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century.114 
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I have argued, firstly, that various recent theories about the history of the 
modern idea of “the West” in English and in the West more generally have 
missed the most important link in the story. That link consists in the writings 
and tireless propagandizing efforts of Auguste Comte. In the modern era it 
was Comte who first developed an explicit idea of “the West” as a socio-
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he saw as the “elite” of humanity and proposing an elaborate plan for the 
reconstruction of that part of the world, “the West,” before it could serve the 
rest of Humanity to achieve the same “positive” state of development. I have 
followed in some detail the gradual adoption of “l’Occident” to replace 
“l’Europe” and found the decisive turn to have happened as of the end of 
1842. Establishing that timing means that “the West” was adopted and 
developed by Comte before his religious turn a few years later and therefore 
was independent of the latter. Once he invented his religion, the West and the 
Religion of Humanity became of course closely associated, but the timing that 
I have established here for his adoption of “the West” means that they were 
neither coeval nor inextricably linked. 
Secondly, to the extent that the idea of “the West” tends to be 
associated with “democracy, individualism and liberalism”115 the attribution 
that I have argued here of a crucial role to Comte complicates the picture. The 
“West” envisaged by Comte was designed to be anything but democratic, 
individualistic or liberal. This does not change the meanings and associations 
acquired by the concept through its later uses, but it shows that such 
meanings and associations were neither inherent to it nor coeval with its 
emergence. There is clearly no single “idea of the West” but many different 
ideas or uses, which need to be studied historically in their own contexts. But 
it is significant to note that the first and most elaborate conceptualisation of a 
modern socio-political idea of the West was not democratic, individualist or 
liberal. Comte’s diagnosis of the problem of modernity was that, in its recent 
revolutionary and “metaphysical” phase, the “vanguard of Humanity” had 




which he called the “Western disease” (la maladie occidentale).116 That is why his 
proposed Spiritual Power would be preoccupied with establishing continuity 
with the past and future generations, why his “Religion of Humanity” was to 
cultivate reverence for past benefactors of Humanity, and the Positivist motto 
“vivre pour autrui” would promote altruism (a term that Comte coined). In 
order to combat “metaphysical” revolutionary notions such as individual 
rights, Comte proposed a deeply illiberal programme of moral regeneration 
through religiously inculcated altruism and love of Humanity. 
However, thirdly, far from its emergence being related to the needs of 
European imperialism as has often been argued, the modern idea of the West 
has clear anti-imperialist origins. Of course prima facie it could be plausible to 
say that Comte’s international vision was one more version of the 
“transnational projects of empire in France” that David Todd analysed in this 
journal recently.117 But seeing only the Franco-centrism of the project would be 
unfair and one-sided. For there was a strong anti-imperialist thrust in Comte’s 
political project. Though strikingly Eurocentric, his long-term utopian plan 
was meant to become universal and inclusive, aimed to encompass the whole 
of Humanity. And no matter how patronising it may appear to us today, if 
judged against any proposed alternatives in the nineteenth century, Comte’s 
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